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In this chapter, we review economic analyses of privacy.  We begin by scrutinizing the 
“free market” argument against privacy regulation, and highlight why it may not work well for 
personal information because welfare may be non-monotone in the quantity of information, there 
may be excessive incentives to collect information that has no social value, and cross-market 
externalities may arise from the exploitation of information.  We then discuss research on 
property rights and suggest some challenges in determining their optimal allocation.   We 
conclude by summarizing the insights provided by recent empirical research and highlighting 
directions for future research in the economics of privacy. 
   1
The Economics of Privacy 
 




Information privacy has been defined as the individual’s ability to control the collection 
and use of personal information (Stigler 1980; Westin 1967).  The invention and development of 
computing technologies led to widespread concern about collection of personal information in 
various contexts, including employment, finance, marketing, and government.  In response to 
these concerns, the U.S. Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development published guidelines (OECD 1980), and the European 
Union adopted a Directive 95/46/EC on data protection.  The EU directive prohibits transfer of 
information to jurisdictions that do not accord adequate protection. 
The development of the Internet and the advent of e-commerce have amplified public 
concern about privacy.  With every website visit, a browser leaves an electronic trace which can 
later be retrieved to analyze the consumers’ online browsing and shopping behavior (Bucklin and 
Sismeiro 2003; Moe and Fader 2001 and 2004; Montgomery et al. 2004; Sismeiro and Bucklin 
2004).  Another technology – the cookie – stores identifying information.  Using clickstream and 
identifying information, website providers can profile visitors.  Such information could benefit 
consumers by more precisely identifying their needs.  However, it can also be used to effect price 
discrimination or exclude individuals with less attractive characteristics.
1  Some organizations 




Clearly, technology has significantly changed business practices, but new opportunities 
come with new concerns.  Westin (2001) concludes: “There has been a well-documented 
                                                 
1  New York Times, “Giving the Web a Memory Cost Its Users Privacy,” September 4, 2001.  Amazon.com’s 
application of dynamic pricing illustrates consumers’ privacy dilemma (“On the Web, Price Tags Blur; What You 
Pay Could Depend on Who You Are,” Washington Post, September 27, 2000). 
2  For instance, Amazon.com lists on its privacy policy “As we continue to develop our business, we might sell or 
buy stores, subsidiaries, or business units. In such transactions, customer information generally is one of the 
transferred business assets… in the unlikely event that Amazon.com, Inc., or substantially all of its assets are 
acquired, customer information will of course be one of the transferred assets.”   2
transformation in consumer privacy attitudes over the past decade, moving concerns from a 
modest matter for a minority of consumers in the 1980s to an issue of high intensity expressed by 
more than three-fourth of American consumers in 2001”. 
The current discourse on individual privacy dates back at least to the seminal Harvard 
Law Review article of Warren and Brandeis (1890).  Privacy is a multi-disciplinary issue that has 
been and should be analyzed from multiple perspectives – law, psychology, sociology, political 
science, and economics.
4  Economics is an especially appropriate discipline as it provides a 
framework to appreciate the key trade-offs in policy towards privacy. 
The earliest economic analyses of privacy focused on the efficiency of markets for 
personal information.   Since the Privacy Act of 1974 regulated only government records, the 
immediate issue was whether the collection and use of personal information by private-sector 
entities should be regulated.   The “Chicago School” (Stigler 1980; Posner 1978, 1979, 1981) 
contended that regulation is not needed – markets for personal information would work as well 
as markets for conventional goods and services. 
However, the Chicago School’s argument ignored the ways in which personal 
information is collected.  Realistically, accurate personal information does not come from 
nowhere; resources must be expended to collect the information, and the collection could have 
undesirable consequences on consumer welfare. 
Further, as Hirshleifer (1980) observed, the Chicago School focused on one dimension of 
privacy, viz., secrecy, and overlooked another dimension – autonomy.  While secrecy concerns 
the privacy of information, autonomy concerns the freedom from intrusion.  The Chicago School 
ignored the issue of whether markets for autonomy require regulation.
5 
6 
                                                                                                                                                             
3  The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently took enforcement action against an online shopping cart 
provider that rented customer information to marketers, which violated the disclosure policy of the online merchants 
that purchased the shopping cart software (Federal Trade Commission 2005). 
4  See, for example, Culnan and Bies (2003), Eddy et al. (1999), Goodwin (1992), Hirshleifer (1980), Laudon 
(1996), Petty (2000), Posner (1978, 1979, 1981), Schwartz (1968), Smith (2001), Stigler (1980), Stone and Stone 
(1990), Tolchinsky et al. (1981), and Woodman et al. (1982). 
5  Hirshleifer (1980) cited telemarketing as an example of violation of autonomy.  Actually, telemarketing requires 
personal information, viz., a telephone number, hence involves violation of secrecy as well.  An example that would 
more clearly distinguish between secrecy and autonomy is nude sunbathing.  A peep does not need the subject’s 
personal information to intrude on the person’s autonomy. 
6  Posner (1981) did acknowledge the definition of privacy as peace and autonomy, but he dismissed these aspects 
by saying “to affix the term privacy to human freedom and autonomy (as in Jack Hirshleifer) is simply to relabel an 
old subject – not to identify a new area for economic research … the range of economic applications in this area 
seems limited.” (p. 405)   3
From an economic standpoint, governments, businesses, and other organizations use 
personal information about individuals in three ways.  First, they use the personal information to 
customize goods and services, discriminate more effectively between people with differing 
willingness to pay or differing reservation wage, and sort more effectively among people with 
different personal characteristics (Chen et al. 2001; Chen and Iyer 2002; Acquisti and Varian 
2005; Calzolari and Pavan 2002; Ghose and Chen 2003; Odlyzko 2003; Taylor 2004 and 2005; 
Wathieu 2002).  The Chicago school posits that these uses of personal information lead to 
socially efficient outcomes and require no government regulation. 
However, the use of personal information to profile individual persons imposes an 
indirect or consequential externality as some suffer from paying relatively higher price, 
receiving a relatively lower wage, or being excluded from enjoying a particular good or service.  
Hence, the exploitation of personal information could lead to ex post inefficiencies.  The classic 
analysis of Hirshleifer (1971) shows that the result of such information might simply be re-
distribution, and so, from a social viewpoint, there might be over-investment in information.  
Even if consumer information is costless, the seller’s private incentives to maximize profit may 
be inconsistent with maximizing social welfare (Acquisti and Varian 2005; Hermalin and Katz 
2004).  Some consumers may get priced out of the market when more information is available to 
the seller, even though it is socially efficient to sell to them. 
Second, personal information may be collected in one market and sold to be used in 
another.  The information collector may itself also sell some item, and hence may have excessive 
incentives to collect consumer information, at the expense of some of its own potential 
consumers (Taylor 2005).
7  That is, the option of selling consumer information for extra 
revenues may further reduce social efficiency both from benefit (loss in trades and increase in 
deadweight losses) and cost (the effort in compiling the information) perspectives. 
The third way in which organizations use personal information about potential clients is 
to direct unsolicited promotions, by direct mail, telephone and fax, and electronically.  These 
solicitations impose costs of intrusion on recipients and are a direct externality.  Unsolicited 
marketing is one type of intrusion against autonomy (Hirshleifer 1980).  A preference for 
autonomy is like a taste for privacy in that intrusions cause a direct externality, unrelated to any   4
effect on the terms of any transaction or trading relationship (Hermalin and Katz 2004; Laudon 
1996).  The majority of privacy research ignores this aspect of information use, but computing 
technologies have facilitated a flood of unsolicited promotions, which annoy consumers and may 
cut productivity. 
Finally, opposing views on privacy and information use have led to different suggestions 
on whether property rights in personal information should be established and how they should be 
assigned.  The Chicago School supports free collection and use of information; hence the issue of 
property rights is moot.  Hermalin and Katz (2004) suggest that individuals would voluntarily 
reveal their personal information to trading partners anyway.  Therefore, it does not matter how 
property rights are assigned.  Laudon (1996), however, argue that exclusive rights should be 
granted to individuals so that they can control the collection and subsequent use of their 
information.
8  He believes this can internalize the privacy costs imposed by sellers on consumers.  
We examine each of these arguments and highlight some challenges in determining the optimal 
allocation of property rights. 
This chapter reviews economic analyses of privacy.  Section 2 begins with the free 
market approach, then Sections 3 and 4 reviews research on the collection and use of information 
respectively.  Then, Section 5 reviews research on property rights, Section 6 considers empirical 
research, and Section 7 concludes with directions for future research. 
 
2. The “Free Market” Approach to Privacy 
 
The Chicago School (Stigler 1980; Posner 1978, 1979, 1981) resolutely affirms that 
markets for personal information would work as well as markets for conventional goods and 
services.  Government regulation would impede economic efficiency.  For instance, unskilled 
workers would suffer relatively more than skilled workers from restrictions on employers in the 
collection and use of personal information about workers.  Likewise, low-income borrowers 
would suffer relatively more than wealthy borrowers from restrictions on lenders in the 
collection and use of personal information about borrowers. 
                                                                                                                                                             
7  The interest of sellers to develop consumer databases is further encouraged by recent adoption of the Suis Generis 
database right by the European Union (directive 2001/29/EC), which grants copyright protection to database owners 
who need not own or create the information in the databases. 
8 See also the analysis by Chellappa and Shivendu (2003).   5
The “free market” approach to privacy may not work efficiently, however, for several 
reasons.  First, as Hermalin and Katz (2004) point out, the Chicago School focuses on ex-post 
efficiency, but overlooks that open and perfect information may destroy the basis for some 
markets with risk and asymmetric information.  Take the insurance market as an example.  If an 
insurer cannot distinguish persons with different health, it may offer medical insurance to healthy 
and unhealthy persons at the same premium.  Then, what the Chicago School views as an 
inefficient cross-subsidy from healthy to unhealthy persons in an ex post sense could also be 
viewed as insurance against bad health in an ex ante sense.  However, if the insurer can use 
personal information to distinguish persons by health level, then it would differentiate policies 
according to the person’s health.  Then, information collection would have undermined the 
market for insurance against bad health.  The same argument applies to investment and gambling 
(e.g., soccer and horse racing betting), and other markets that involve risk assessments. 
Second, and more fundamentally, within the context of ex post efficiency, the Chicago 
School’s argument works only when sellers have perfect information about consumers.  Welfare 
may not be monotone, however, in the quantity of personal information (Hermalin and Katz 
2004).  In a setting of “second-best”, an increase in the quantity of personal information might 
reduce welfare, and accordingly, protection of privacy might raise welfare. 
Third, even if it is feasible for sellers to acquire perfect information about consumers, the 
way such information is collected and subsequently used in ways other than price discrimination 
(e.g., selling to third parties, directing unsolicited promotions) might reduce social welfare. 
The idea behind the first problem (ex ante vs. ex post efficiency) is fairly trivial and we 
shall not elaborate it here.  The second and third problems concern non-trivial production and 
exploitation of personal information, which are at the heart of many ongoing privacy debates.  
We survey recent economic advances on these two problems below.  To facilitate our discussion, 
we organize the review along two dimensions – collection and use of personal information.   6
3. Collection of Personal Information 
 
Individual personal characteristics (income, employment, preferences, etc.) may be 
collected directly or inferred from past behavior.  Acquisti and Varian (2005) and Taylor (2005) 
analyze how consumer characteristics may be inferred from past transactions. 
Consider a market with two types of consumers, both of whom possibly make repeat 
purchases.  The high-type consumers are willing to pay more for an item than the low-type 
consumers.  The marginal cost of the item is sufficiently low that it is efficient to provide the 
item to both consumer types.  If personal information collection is prohibited, a seller will set the 
same price over time, which price depends on the composition of the consumer population.  In 
particular, if the proportion of low-type consumers is high enough (what Taylor (2005) calls 
“elastic demand”), the seller will set a price low enough that all consumers – low and high types 
– buy, and such that the high-type consumers enjoy a positive surplus.  This equilibrium is 
efficient. 
Now, suppose that the seller can infer the consumer types in the first period, for example, 
from the consumers’ transaction history.  Then, the seller can present consumers with different 
prices in subsequent periods (Acquisti and Varian (2005) call this “price conditioning”).  That is, 
after identifying the consumer types in the first period, the seller can perfectly price discriminate 
in subsequent periods.  Then, under particular conditions, the seller will set a high price so that 
only high-types buy in the first period.  The remaining consumers (who do not buy) are then 
revealed to be low types.  These consumers suffer a deadweight loss. 
The intuition of this result is straightforward.  When personal information collection is 
feasible, the seller faces a tradeoff: by charging a high price in the first period, it forgoes profit 
from the low-type consumers, but it gains from identifying the high-type consumers and price 
discriminating against them in subsequent periods. 
This analysis exemplifies Hirshleifer’s (1971) theory – the purchase history has private 
“information” value to the seller, but it only leads to a redistribution of surplus and does not 
create social value.  In fact, it harms social welfare by reducing the consumption of the low-type 
consumers.  Therefore, the seller has private incentives to compile the purchase history, but such 
an incentive is socially excessive.   7
It is easy to predict what increases the seller’s incentives to collect consumer information.  
In the stylized example above, a wider gap between the high- and low-type consumers’ 
valuations, a higher proportion of high-type consumers, a longer time horizon (i.e., more future 
repurchases), and the ability to address consumers exclusively with targeted prices, would 
increase the seller’s incentive to conduct the price experiment in the first period. 
Note that the collection of personal information could also raise welfare.  This arises 
when, absent the ability to record transaction information (and thereby discriminate), the seller 
chooses to sell only to high-type consumers.  By enabling discrimination, the collection of 
purchase history then leads the seller to sell to low-type consumers as well, and so, increases 
welfare. 
The situation becomes more complicated if the other side of the market (in the above 
example, consumers) also acts strategically.  Suppose again that, when unable to record 
transaction information, the seller sells only to high-type consumers.  Then, the collection of 
personal information benefits the seller and low-type consumers.  Suppose further that the 
consumers can credibly reveal their personal characteristics.
9  Then, in equilibrium, both the 
seller and low-type consumers would engage in some “production of information” – the seller 
would employ technologies to solicit consumer profiles, and the low-type consumers would 
voluntarily reveal their characteristics.  The production of information is mutually beneficial; 
therefore, the efforts of the seller and low-type consumers to produce information are strategic 
substitutes. 
Now, if the seller’s cost of information collection is higher, then it would collect less.  In 
turn, this would lead low-type consumers to raise their efforts in producing information.  If the 
response of the low-type consumers is sufficiently large, the total amount of information 
produced and social welfare could both rise (Gould 1980).
10  Similarly, reducing the cost of 
information production could lead to less information being produced and reduce welfare. 
Overall, personal information may not be socially useful (as in the purchase history 
example above) and, even if it is, reducing the cost of collecting or producing such information 
                                                 
9  Students may produce school or university identity cards and seniors may show proof of age to qualify for lower 
prices.  In the employment context, job seekers may produce reference letters from past employers, professional 
certificates, and school transcripts to prove their ability. 
10  It is easy to construct reaction functions that, in the new equilibrium, the aggregate information produced is 
higher (Gould 1980).   8
does not necessarily lead to production of more information or higher welfare.  The welfare 
consequences are ambiguous unless individuals have a very strong taste for privacy. 
Note, however, that we have focused on collecting personal information for use in the 
same market (e.g., selling an item, employing a worker).  As we discuss below, the situation is 
different if we consider other uses of personal information. 
 
4. Use of Personal Information 
 
In this section, we consider how the use of personal information affects the efficiency of 
market outcomes.  We consider three scenarios: where the information is collected and used in 
the same market (within market consequential externality), where the information is collected in 
one market and used in another (cross-market consequential externality), and direct marketing, 




A common use of personal information is to devise customized offers (products, prices, 
employment contracts, insurance, etc.) to better suit the tastes or characteristics of particular 
individuals.  This is claimed to promote exchange and hence market efficiency.  To evaluate this 
argument, many economic analyses of privacy and personalization draw from the literature of 
asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973; Stiglitz 1975) and product differentiation 
(Katz 1984; Moorthy 1984; Mussa and Rosen 1978). 
In the following review, we adopt the classification of Hermalin and Katz (2004) and 
distinguish two classes of situation where privacy might matter.  In one, personal information is 
not productive – the costs of the uninformed party do not depend on the personal characteristics 
of the informed party as, for instance, in the case of pure price discrimination.  In the other class, 
personal information is productive – the costs of the uninformed party do depend on the personal 
characteristics of the informed party as, for instance, in the case of an employer recruiting 
workers of differing skill or an insurer covering persons with differing health. 
   9
Non-productive Information 
Like Acquisti and Varian (2005) and Taylor (2005), Hermalin and Katz (2004) develop a 
model in which a monopoly seller has asymmetric information about consumers with either high 
or low valuation for some item.  The seller’s pricing strategy depends on its information about 
the consumer population.  The situation is static – the consumers purchase only once, and the 
seller cannot distinguish the consumer types.  Consumers self-select consumption levels from a 
set of choices provided (Katz 1984; Moorthy 1984; Mussa and Rosen 1978).  The marginal cost 
of the item is sufficiently low that it is efficient to provide the item to both consumer types. 
Although the settings are somewhat different, the results of Hermalin and Katz (2004) are 
similar to those of Acquisti and Varian (2005).  Suppose that, originally, the seller sells only to 
the high-type consumers.  Additional information will enable the seller to better sort between 
high and low types.  If it leads the seller to sell to both types, then welfare would rise.  However, 
suppose that, originally, the seller sold to a pool of both high and low types.  If the additional 
information leads the seller to reduce the quantity provided to the low types, it would reduce 
welfare.  Accordingly, privacy regulation (which would reduce the availability of personal 
information) might raise or reduce social welfare. 
Wathieu (2004) considers a setting in which consumers have specific tastes for different 
products.  Ex ante, a seller cannot distinguish the consumer types, and it incurs an advertising 
cost to address each individual consumer with a product.  The advertising cost must be repeated 
for each product that the seller markets to a particular consumer.  If the seller acquires personal 
information of the consumers and uses it to segment the market, it can reduce advertising costs 
because the advertisements are more accurately directed.  In this context, “privacy” may hinder 
segmentation, and hence increase the sellers’ duplication of advertising costs. 
However, setting aside the advertising costs, more information about consumers may not 
necessarily improve social efficiency – in some markets a finer classification of consumers may 
lead the seller to neglect marginal consumers.  Hence, the quantity sold may decrease and 
deadweight loss may increase.  Mainstream consumers (the majority who hold common tastes 
toward a product) would be happy with privacy, however, because if the seller gets a finer 
                                                                                                                                                             
11  These are often considered “secondary use” of personal information because the information, such as payment 
instruction or delivery address, is used in ways other than completing the primary transaction (e.g., purchasing an 
item from an online store).   10
classification, they would face higher prices.  Therefore, they have incentives to expend 
resources to protect privacy. 
Generally, detailed personal information causes redistribution of surplus among sellers 
and consumers, but it does not necessarily generate more exchange.  Hence, the concerns of 
consumers about price discrimination seem to be well justified – some consumers may pay more 
when their information is exploited (as in Amazon.com’s short-lived application of dynamic 
pricing),
12 and sellers may not reduce prices and sell to marginal (low-value) consumers.   
Although personal information may help sellers to reduce marketing costs (as in Wathieu 2004), 
sellers may over-invest in information which is not socially productive (Hirshleifer 1971).   
Therefore, the social value of privacy regulation is ambiguous. 
 
Productive Information 
Hermalin and Katz (2004) apply a model in which competitive employers face a 
population of workers, some of whom have high productivity while others have low 
productivity.  Each employer needs just one worker.  In the economically efficient allocation, 
both types of worker would be employed. 
Suppose that the original equilibrium pools high and low types at a common wage.  Since 
both types of worker are employed, this equilibrium is efficient.  Now, divide the worker 
population into two pools.  With additional information, employers can more accurately identify 
high-type workers.  If the proportion of high types in the “good” pool is sufficiently large (and 
that in the other “bad” pool is low), then in competitive equilibrium, employers will employ all 
workers in the “good” pool at a common wage, but pay a low wage to the bad pool.  The low 
wage would attract only low types, hence the high-type workers in the bad pool would be 
unemployed.  This would reduce welfare relative to the original equilibrium. 
By contrast, suppose that the original equilibrium includes only low types.  This adverse 
selection equilibrium is not efficient.  Again, divide the worker population into two pools, and 
suppose that additional information enables employers to more accurately identify high-type 
workers.   If the proportion of high types in a “good” pool is sufficiently large, then in 
competitive equilibrium, employers will employ all workers in the “good” pool at a common 
wage.  This would raise welfare relative to the original equilibrium. 
                                                 
12 Op. cit.   11
Taylor (2004) also addresses the issue of over/under-investment in productive personal 
information in a competitive equilibrium, but using a somewhat different setting.  Each employer 
seeks a worker, who has either high or low productivity.   The worker does not know her own 
productivity.  In the economic efficient allocation, only the high-type worker would be 
employed.  The employer can invest in information about the worker.  When the information 
about high-type workers is perfect but information about low-type workers is subject to error, the 
employer will over-invest in information.  However, when the information about high-type 
workers is subject to error but information about low-type workers is perfect, the employer will 
under-invest in information. 
The analyses of Hermalin and Katz (2004) and Taylor (2004) imply that there is no 
simple rule: whether privacy of personal information raises or reduces welfare depends on the 
circumstances. Although interesting in their own right, the implications of the analysis for 
privacy are ambiguous. 
A separate stream of research has considered how privacy policy functions as a way by 
which the government can make commitments in tax policy.  The government may use income 
tax to re-distribute income from high to low income earners.  If the government sets tax rates 
after individuals have decided their investment in something that increases their future earnings, 
say education, a time consistency problem arises.  Fearing that the government will set high tax 
rates in the future, taxpayers will under-invest in education (Boadway et al. 1996). 
In this context, a privacy policy is an effective way by which the government can commit 
to lower tax rates in the future (Konrad 2001): the privacy policy limits the government's ability 
to collect information and hence to levy high tax rates.  Accordingly, the privacy policy serves to 
encourage taxpayers’ investment in activities that increase their future earnings. 
Dodds (2003) considers a different setting, where individuals of two types benefit from a 
public good.  The socially efficient quantity of the public good depends on the number of high-
type persons.  The high-type persons are reluctant to reveal themselves as they must then 
contribute towards the public good.  The model is related to analyses of taxpayer compliance 
where taxpayers whose income is private information must report their income subject to 
government auditing.  As in the taxpayer compliance analyses (see, for instance, Mookherjee and 
Png 1989), Dodd’s key result is that 100% auditing does not maximize welfare.  He interprets 
this to mean that some degree of privacy is socially efficient.   12
In the analyses of both non-productive and productive information, an improvement in 
the accuracy of personal information causes the less informed party (seller or employer) to 
include or exclude marginal persons (consumers or workers).  Hence, there is an indirect or 
consequential externality imposed by the less informed party on some members of the other side 
of the market.  Such an indirect externality can be positive or negative, and therefore, it is 
difficult to predict whether government regulation of privacy raises or reduces social welfare. 
 
Cross-Market 
Marketers may compile customer databases for sale to third parties.  For example, many 
email portals transfer the demographics of account holders to business partners so that the 
business partners could contact the account holders for promotions.  The policy implications with 
respect to exploiting the purchased information by “information buyers” are similar to those in 
the cases that we have reviewed in the preceding sections.  Hence, we consider only the actions 
of the “information sellers”. 
The basic finding here is that the marketer may have an excessive incentive to collect 
consumer information, as shown in a different context by Acquisti and Varian (2005).  Taylor 
(2005) shows that this incentive is reinforced if the seller can sell the collected information to 
third parties, because the revenue from such a sale would raise the marginal return from the price 
experiment.  Hence, the seller is more likely to charge a high price to identify the high-type 
consumers.  When demand is somewhat elastic (i.e., the seller would sell to all consumers absent 
the opportunity to sell information), the option to sell consumer information would lead the seller 
to restrict output, and hence, reduce welfare. 
Addressing a similar problem, Calzolari and Pavan (2005) develop a very sophisticated 
model that considers interaction between two different uninformed parties, say sellers, with a 
common informed party, say a buyer whose characteristics are private information, over time.  
They identify conditions under which the early seller will transfer information about the buyer to 
the later seller.  In particular, when the early seller is not interested in the exchange between the 
buyer and later seller, the buyer’s valuations toward the two sellers’ products are positively 
correlated, and the buyer’s preferences in the two sellers’ products are separable, then the early 
seller may prefer to protect the buyer’s privacy.  By contrast, when any one of these conditions is 
not met, the early seller may transfer the buyer’s information to the later seller because he may   13
capture additional rents arising from information or contractual externalities.  The effect of 
disclosure on welfare is ambiguous – disclosure may promote the exchange between the buyer 
and later seller, but it could also introduce new distortions in the buyer’s exchange with the early 
seller. 
Overall, it seems that the selling of personal information benefits “information buyers” 
(downstream sellers).  As for social welfare in downstream markets, it could increase or decrease 
depending on the composition of the consumer population (as we discussed in Sections 3 and 4.1 
above).  However, in the upstream market (where the personal information is collected), welfare 
may decrease because sellers have higher incentive to raise price in order to classify consumers 
(Calzolari and Pavan 2004; Taylor 2005).  The upstream sellers can then compile informative 
customer databases and sell them to downstream sellers.  Therefore, a cross-market externality 
may emerge when selling of consumer information is allowed.  In general, sale of consumer 
information is more likely to be beneficial when the potential of such information is high (e.g., 
when the classification of consumers can help match seller offers and interested consumers).  If 
the information does not lead to more efficient exchange in downstream markets, then it may be 
worthwhile to discourage its sale (which would in turn discourage upstream sellers from 
collecting the information). 
 
Direct Marketing Solicitations 
Personal information is much used to direct unsolicited promotions.  However, 
realistically, huge quantities of junk mail and email are discarded.  From the business 
perspective, these are wasted resources.  Ideally, the marketer would promote only to consumers 
who are interested in its products.  However, it cannot perfectly distinguish interested from 
disinterested consumers.  Solicitations impose a direct externality on the disinterested persons.  
In the presence of such a negative externality, it is evident that there is a market failure and 
businesses over-invest in solicitations (Petty 2000). 
Hann et al. (2005a) study direct marketing solicitations to consumers who behave 
strategically.  There are two types of consumers: high-type consumers value some item highly 
and are willing to buy it if solicited; low-type consumers have a lower value for the item and 
would invest in concealment (e.g., by registering in do-not-call lists) or deflection (e.g., by 
screening incoming telephone calls) to avoid receiving solicitations.  Sellers cannot distinguish   14
the consumer types ex ante.  Instead, they pay to solicit the general consumer population, and 
then discover consumer types ex post. 
Under fairly general conditions, the sellers’ solicitations are strategic complements with 
the low-type consumers’ concealment.  Because solicitations impose a negative externality on 
low-type consumers, sellers over-invest in solicitations.  Hence, if the seller’s cost of collecting 
information is reduced, they would increase solicitations and induce consumers to increase 
spending on concealment.  This is further exacerbated by a peer-to-peer production externality 
among the low-type consumers: the more that other low-type consumers spend on concealment, 
the more exposed each low-type consumer will be, and hence the more that she will spend on 
concealment.
13  Social welfare decreases because of the privacy and concealment costs borne by 
the low-type consumers. 
It is instructive to note that complete “privacy” (i.e., disallowing the sellers to use 
personal information for solicitations) is not ideal either, as that would prevent the high-type 
consumers from enjoying the item.  Essentially, the interests of the two consumer types are in 
conflict – one wants to enjoy the item, whereas the other does not and prefers not to be solicited. 
Addressing a similar problem, Anderson and de Palma (2005) model consumer attention 
as a scarce resource, and find that sellers tend to over-promote their products.  There could be 
multiple equilibria, including one in which junk messages prevail and the quality of messages 
sent is so poor that consumers choose not to open any messages.  This market failure is 
reminiscent of the well known “lemons” problem (Akerlof 1970). 
Tang et al. (2005) consider a setting where violation of privacy imposes a direct cost on 
consumers.  Consumers differ in their sensitivity to privacy violation while sellers differ in their 
cost of protecting privacy.  When few consumers are sensitive, welfare is maximized with a 
regime of “caveat emptor”, as businesses avoid the cost of protecting privacy.  By contrast, when 
many consumers are sensitive, welfare is maximized with mandatory privacy regulation, as 
consumers avoid the cost of comprehending each business’ privacy policy.  In the intermediate 
case, welfare is maximized with privacy seals – the low-cost businesses choose to purchase the 
seal, while the high-cost businesses do not. 
Overall, it is clear that sellers tend to over-invest in unsolicited promotions.  Regulating 
privacy or use of personal information may help restore the social optimum.  However, sweeping 
                                                 
13 This peer-to-peer externality is a plausible application of Gould’s (1980) analysis.   15
solutions, such as banning unsolicited promotions or spam emails, may cause high-value 
consumers to suffer and reduce welfare.  Even practices that seem generally appealing, such as 
establishing do-not-call lists (a convenient way for consumers to opt out of promotions), may 
have surprising and negative consequences on welfare.  It appears that a tax on unsolicited 
promotions is by far the most encouraging solution (Anderson and de Palma 2005; Hann et al. 
2005a; Kraut et al. 2002). 
 
5. Property Rights 
 
Will the appropriate assignment of property rights (self-regulation) resolve the issue of 
privacy?  The Chicago School posits that a free market for information yields social efficiency.  
Hence, an explicit allocation of property rights may shift society away from a socially efficient 
equilibrium and reduce welfare.  For instance, granting workers property rights to their personal 
information may cause an employer to hire fewer workers. 
In their analyses of both non-productive and productive information, Hermalin and Katz 
(2004) show that the market outcome is identical regardless of how property rights over personal 
information are assigned.  Specifically, in the case of non-productive information, the monopoly 
seller can compel customers to reveal their type.  In the case of competition with productive 
information, high-type workers will identify themselves, thus revealing the low types.  Similarly, 
Kahn et al. (2000) show that, if there is sufficient flexibility in contracting, information would be 
revealed to an efficient degree.  The outcome obeys the Coase Theorem – it does not matter 
whether or how property rights to personal information are assigned. 
However, the analyses of Hermalin and Katz (2004) and Kahn et al. (2000) apply to 
situations where the collection and use of personal information take place within the same 
(primary) market.  What if the relatively uninformed party uses the information in secondary 
contexts as, for instance, when a marketer sells consumer information gathered at one website to 
third parties to direct spam?  Then a cross-market externality will arise.  The parties with 
personal information will certainly consider the cross-market externality when deciding whether 
to reveal their information. 
The impact of the allocation of property rights to personal information in primary market 
may well depend on the relation between the party’s positions in the primary and secondary   16
markets.  Will a high type worker in the primary market also be a high type worker in the 
secondary market?  When the secondary use of the information is uncertain, property rights may 
have a role. 
Based on the above reviews, it appears that property rights may not necessarily improve 
social welfare when the information is collected or used in “primary” markets (one in which the 
information has direct value to sellers in configuring offers for consumers), largely because we 
cannot conclude if less information is necessarily better for promoting exchange.  In secondary 
transactions, such as direct marketing solicitations, however, property rights may help reduce the 
externality that sellers impose on low-value or privacy-sensitive consumers.  Therefore, it may 
be worthwhile to attach a value to personal information, at least in terms of restricting future uses 
of the information.  The challenge then lies in how such a value is determined. 
It is quite natural to expect that allowing consumers to set their own values for personal 
information may lead to “alienability” of data (Schwartz 2004) – consumers may attach too high 
a price to their personal information, which might excessively raise the barrier to potential 
buyers of the information.  Specifically, economic experiments have repeatedly shown that 
people demand a higher price for a property when another person seeks to use it than the price 
that they would offer to protect the property from being used (see, e.g., Boyce et al. 1992).  In 
the context of personal information, a person’s “willingness to accept” (WTA) for use of their 
personal information (when they have explicit property rights over the information) may be 
much higher than their “willingness to pay” (WTP) for protection of their information from 
exploitation (when no property right is granted).  Granting property rights to individuals and 
allowing them to name their own price may lead to under-usage of information, whereas 
allowing the free use of personal information could lead to over-usage. 
The difference between WTA and WTP for personal information could help explain the 
disparate findings from opinion polls and behavioral experiments.  Specifically, when polled for 
their opinions on or attitudes toward privacy, people may assume they “own” their personal 
information and hence demand a high price for use of their information.  By contrast, when 
confronted with actual information requests and when they realize that protecting their personal 
information may be “costly” (e.g., they may not be able to use a website or complete a 
transaction if they do not supply the information), they demand less compensation.  Behavioral   17
experiments have shown that people provide their information in exchange for even small 
rewards or incentives. 
Clearly, it would be misleading to judge the importance of privacy by purely looking at 
opinion polls.  Rigorous experiments are necessary to gauge the actual value that people attach to 
their personal information under various circumstances.  Perhaps the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
(BDM) mechanism (Becker et al. 1964) can be employed to elicit the incentive-compatible 
reservation prices that people place on their personal information.  It would be important to 
recognize the likely gap between WTA and WTP, and assess the benefits of allocating property 
rights accordingly. 
 
6.  Empirical Evidence 
 
To gauge the economic significance of privacy as a public policy issue, it is vital to know 
how much people value their privacy.   Polls and surveys have repeatedly shown that people are 
concerned about privacy (Westin 2001).  However, the key policy issue is not whether 
individuals value privacy.  It is obvious that people value privacy.  What is not known is how 
much people value privacy and the extent to which people differ in their valuations. 
Despite tremendous debate and policy interests, there has, to date, been little research into 
this question (Hahn 2001).  Indeed, it has been conjectured that “measuring the value of 
consumer privacy may prove to be intractable” (Ward 2001). 
Recent opinion surveys and experimental research provide some insights on this question.  
In November 1998, among 381 U.S. respondents to an online survey, most were willing to reveal 
personal information but would not reveal personal identifying information (Ackerman et al. 
1999).  For instance, 58% would report income, investments, and investment goals to obtain 
customized investment advice, but only 35% would also reveal their name and address. 
In May to June 2000, the Pew Internet and American Life Project found that, among 
1,017 American Internet users, 54% would provide personal information in order to use a 
website, whereas only 27% were hard-core privacy protectionists who would never provide their 
personal information to websites (Fox et al. 2000).  In February to March 2003, the Annenberg 
Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania found that, among a sample of 1,200 
respondents, aged 18 years or older, who used the Internet at home, most who did not accept a   18
website’s data collection policy would nevertheless disclose their real name and email address if 
they valued the website (Turow 2003). 
More compelling than surveys are various experiments that gauged subjects’ willingness 
to reveal personal information.  Hui et al. (2004) conducted a field experiment to measure the 
likelihood that individuals would provide personal information to Internet businesses.  By 
estimating a discrete choice model using real online participation data, they found that people 
were willing to disclose more personal information in exchange for small monetary incentives.  
Similarly, in a laboratory experiment, Hui (2004) reports that simple interface redesign could 
induce consumers to disclose more personal information. 
An experiment at Humboldt University provides further indirect evidence (Berendt et al. 
2005).   206 volunteers interacted with an anthropomorphic 3-D shopping bot to select a compact 
camera or winter jacket.   The bot engaged subjects in dialogue about product attributes and also 
posed ‘soft’ questions typical of selling in conventional stores.  The experimental subjects 
willingly revealed personal identifying information to the bot, specifically, 35-40% provided 
their home address. 
The surveys and experiments clearly show that people value privacy, but to an extent less 
than some privacy advocates have claimed.  In particular, many survey respondents indicated use 
of websites as a sufficient motivation to provide personal information.  The results suggest that 
consumer information can be directly solicited in exchange for simple monetary or procedural 
measures.  Further, they also suggest that governments should evaluate practical implications for 
Internet businesses before introducing stringent privacy regulations. 
A question related to individuals’ value for privacy in general is how they value the use 
of their personal information.  A set of conjoint analyses at Singapore and U.S. universities show 
that people are willing to bear the risks of improper access to or secondary use of their 
information in exchange for monetary incentives or increased convenience (Hann et al. 2003).  In 
particular, the U.S. and Singapore subjects valued improper access to personal information at 
around US$11-20, whereas they valued secondary use at around US$8-27.  Hence, despite 
consumers’ protests against price discrimination, sale of personal information to unauthorized 
third parties, spam, etc., it may not be that difficult to convince them to agree to these 
information uses.   19
Hann et al. (2003) also identified three distinct segments in the consumer population – 
privacy guardians (the majority), information sellers, and convenience seekers.  However, these 
segments were not significantly correlated with demographic characteristics.  By contrast, using 
census data, Varian et al. (2004) identified household characteristics of telephone numbers 
registered with the U.S. national “do not call” list.  Those with annual incomes exceeding 
US$100,000 and college-level education were significantly more likely to register, while those 
with a member in the 13-19 age group were significantly less likely to register.   It is intuitive 
that wealthier households would suffer more annoyance from telemarketing calls.  Why 
households with teenagers suffer relatively less is more of a puzzle. 
In the context of direct email marketing, marketers do not bear the privacy costs imposed 
on consumers.  Since the cost of spam is very low, do spammers broadcast their solicitations 
randomly?  Contrary to popular impression (e.g., Muris 2003), spam is not random but rather 
targeted.  In a field experiment, Hann et al. (2005b) find that the incidence of spam was higher 
among email accounts created with particular service providers, accounts with particular 
declared interests, and accounts associated with persons more likely to make online purchases 
(Americans rather than Singaporeans, adults rather than teenagers). 
Further, the spam arena provides evidence of the effectiveness of self-regulation.   
Websites do indeed comply with their published privacy policies (Jamal et al. 2003).
14 Hence, if 
self-regulation of privacy were economically efficient, it could work. 
To conclude, the evidence so far indicates that consumers are not truly so sensitive about 
privacy.  Economic solutions, such as the exchange of personal information for monetary 
incentives, convenience, or special resources, may suffice to regulate the market for personal 
information (Laudon 1996).  The contentious debate about privacy regulation may have been 
misdirected – the question does not lie in whether tighter control should be placed on 





                                                 
14  Information providers could also commit to privacy protection through service-level agreements with their users 
(Pau 2005).   20
7.  Future Directions 
 
Clearly, a free market in personal information will not provide an economically efficient 
outcome.  Apart from this conclusion, the analysis of privacy appears to yield only negative 
results.  Depending on the circumstances, privacy over personal information may raise or lower 
welfare.  This should not be surprising, as, generally, the direction of welfare gain in “second-
best” situations is ambiguous. 
However, even so, the analyses could aim at more specific comparative statics 
implications.  For instance, Hermalin and Katz (2004) might aim to identify which segments 
desire privacy, and whether the demand for privacy varies with changes in exogenous 
parameters.  Acquisti and Varian (2005) and Taylor (2005) characterize the equilibria that 
involve price conditioning and selling personal information, but can these equilibria be shifted by 
policy or marketing instruments to improve social efficiency?  Similarly, Anderson and de Palma 
(2005) might consider how to rule out the equilibria with “lemons” and facilitate the ones with 
efficient examinations of email messages.  Such implications would inform the formulation of 
public policy and business strategy, and also provide directions for empirical research. 
We see several key directions for future research.  First, in all of the various models that 
apply the asymmetric information approach, it is assumed that the uninformed party knows of 
the existence of the parties with private personal information and knows their distribution of 
personal characteristics, but just doesn’t know the characteristics of individual persons.  But 
what if the uninformed party doesn’t even know the distribution of personal characteristics?  
Would the results be the same if the analysis begins from the uninformed party’s beliefs about 
the distribution of the other party’s personal characteristics? 
Second, personal information, like information in general, is a public good (Stigler 1980).  
Economists have given little attention to the public-good aspects of privacy, specifically, the 
conditions for the optimal production and usage when the marginal cost of usage is zero.  For 
instance, if disclosure of AIDS test results were mandatory, individuals might forgo testing, 
which would lead to unintended adverse consequences (Hermalin and Katz 2004). 
Third, as our discussion of WTP vis-à-vis WTA makes clear, there is substantial potential 
to apply behavioral economics for a better understanding of privacy. Personal information is   21
such a sensitive thing that individual behavior is relatively more likely to depart from the rational 
model with respect to personal information than other things. 
Fourth, prior research and discussion has focused on privacy of personal information.  Do 
the same analyses and conclusions apply to privacy of corporate information?  Under what 
circumstances does protection of corporate information raise social welfare?  This question is the 
counterpart to a key issue in accounting research, viz., disclosure.  The issue of corporate privacy 
also bears on two concepts that accounting research does not address – trade secrets in 
intellectual property and corporate reputation. 
Finally, we should mention economics-oriented research into the technology of privacy.   
Loder et al. (2004) apply the theory of mechanism design to devise an incentive-compatible 
technology to screen out spam.   For the time being, the application of economics to the 
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